Do you _really_ think that what people are up in arms about is forged calling party ID on PC to PC calls handled by a single carrier? No way.
The problem is that VOIP carriers are feeding bogus calling party numbers into the PSTN. These carriers typically connect to the PSTN via ISDN trunks where the signaling is Q.931; the Q.931SS7 interworking standard is very clear that trunks to "customers" should clear the network-provided bit on all calling party numbers. And, as far as I'm concerned, if you don't validate the numbers you're sending up the trunk into the PSTN, you are a "customer"; you are not a "network", because you are not operating at the level of trust that would allow other networks to treat calling party numbers supplied by you as canonical.
The other problem is that the standard for delivery of CLID to analog sets does not preserve the distinction between customer-provided and network-provided numbers. In a network environment in which originating carriers do not validate customer-provided numbers as being associated with the same BTN as that of the facility on which they were delivered (which is what they should do; but at present just about nobody does) the only sane thing to do is _never present customer-provided numbers over the analog interface_. Either present "number unavailable" or present the BTN instead -- every call has to have a BTN, so it's always available for use. This is what the FCC could require, in order to solve this problem -- along with requiring carriers to disconnect peers who pass them customer-provided, unverified numbers as "network provided".
Thor Lancelot Simon snipped-for-privacy@rek.tjls.com
"We cannot usually in social life pursue a single value or a single moral aim, untroubled by the need to compromise with others." - H.L.A. Hart