Sadly, it can be straightforwardly detectable, using an intentional MITM approach.
Consider a corporate environment with many PCs. Further, consider all these PCs having a centrally managed internal certificate authority. Now because all these PCs trust the CA, it's possible for this CA to generate trusted certificates for any domain "out there". Now add in a firewall that can work with the CA to generate certificates dynamically (on the fly, if you will).
The scenario then presented is one where the firewall/proxy can act as an end point for an external https connection, and it can create a legimate https connection to the internal user, signed by its own CA as being valid for the external domain.
External -> Firewall [ Scan and A/V ] -> Internal user.
Unless the internal user thinks to check the CA for the https certificate, there is no way they can detect that the "secure" website they are viewing has been compromised by a deliberate MITM "attack". (My quotes.)
Chris